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L Introduction: Have We Really Seen the Last of the Balanced Budget
Amendment?
OnJanuary 5, 1998, President Clinton announced that he was
submitting to Congress the first balanced federal budget in thirty
years.' Within two months, the Congressional Budget Office
* B.A., University of California - Berkeley, 1996; J.D. candidate, Yale Law
School. The author wishes to thank Professors Michael Graetz and Jerry Mashaw for
their many thoughtful comments on this article. Theo Angelis, Brian Kreiswirth,
Maya Ponte, and Dana Wagner were also helpful in this regard and in many other
ways.
' See Art Pine, Clinton to Propose the First Balanced Budget in 30 Years, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 6, 1998, at Al.
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announced even better news for the Administration; specifically,
the government was projected to run an eight billion dollar
surplus in 1998.2 Republicans and Democrats alike reveled in the
thought that for the first time in a generation, they could finally
claim to be keeping the American economy afloat without
burdening future generations of taxpayers. According to some
members of Congress, the successful enactment of a balanced
budget would finally lay to rest the haunting specter of a
constitutional amendment requiring a balanced federal budget.
s
While the enactment of a balanced budget obviously
diminishes the likelihood that Congress will pass a constitutional
Balanced Budget Amendment any time soon, reports of the
Amendment's death have been greatly exaggerated. Even in the
wake of the President's announcement that a balanced budget was
imminent, a number of congressional candidates continued to
trumpet their continued support for a Balanced Budget
Amendment. 4 Prominent leaders in the Republican Party have
repeatedly expressed their continued support for the
Amendment, even in the wake of the bipartisan balanced budget
2 See Janet Hook, Surplus Ahead of Schedule: $8 Billion Budget Cushion Seen This
Year, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 4, 1998, at 34.
s See, e.g., David Espo, Clinton, GOP Meet Halfway on Fiscal Plan, STAR-LEDGER
(Newark), May 3, 1997, at 1 (quoting Senator Toricelli's statement that the budget
compromise proves that the budget can be balanced without resorting to a
constitutional amendment).
I See, e.g., Frank A. Aukofer, Neumann's "Wish List" Includes National Debt Act...,
MILWAUKEEJ. & SENTINEL, Jan. 1, 1998, at 12 ("Despite the fact that the budget now
is balanced, [Representative] Neumann says that could be reversed 'if the taxers and
spenders ever regain control on Congress."'); Cornelia Grumman, GOP Sweating over
Candidate of White Rights, CHI. TRIBUNE, Feb. 27, 1998, at 1 (noting that Karl Groth, a
candidate for Congress, is emphasizing that he will "push for a Balanced Budget
Amendment" if elected); Michael Hytha, Tauscher Ready for Second Run: This Time,
Both Sides Say She Will Be Tough to Beat, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 20, 1998, at A19 (discussing
a Democratic Representative's continued support for the Amendment as an element
of her appeal to moderate voters); Christopher Keating, Franks Enters Race, Says Dodd
is Out of Touch, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 21, 1998, at Al ("A conservative
Republican, Franks is calling for a Balanced Budget Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution."); Steven Suo &Jennifer Senior, Walden Joins Race for Smith's House Seat,
PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Feb. 11, 1998, at DI (noting Walden's continued support for
the Amendment); Voters Guide Texas Primary 1998, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Feb.
24, 1998, at 2 (referring to statement of Congressman Joe Barton that the Balanced
Budget Amendment remains a solution to the nation's most serious problem-the
persistence of big government).
BALANCED BUDGET AMENDMENT
legislation.'
While it may be true that the passage of a balanced budget
agreement has quieted the public's cries for a constitutional
amendment, the GOP can still score political points through its
support of the Balanced Budget Amendment. Now that most
Democratic elected officials have voted for a balanced budget, the
Republicans need an issue that will allow them to demonstrate
that they are more fiscally responsible than their Democratic
counterparts. The Balanced Budget Amendment, which is still
opposed by most Democrats, may be the best way of drawing that
distinction. Because the Balanced Budget Amendment can be cast
as an effort to permanently require fiscal discipline, it is the best way
for Republicans to trump the Democrats and their newfound
fiscal conservative credentials.
Finally, the Balanced Budget Amendment will remain an
attractive option for Congress due to the minimal political costs of
voting in its favor. In previous Congresses, Democratic opposition
to the Amendment was buttressed by arguments that actually
balancing the budget would require politically unpopular
spending cuts or tax increases. However, now that Congress has
successfully committed itself to such actions, that argument has
6lost all salience. Thus, it is possible that the Balanced Budget
Amendment will remain high on the Republican agenda during
the next Congress.
Though it might seem like ancient history in the era of
balanced budgets, it is worth recalling that during the first term of
the 105th Congress, Senate Republicans introduced a Balanced
Budget Amendment to the Constitution as Senate Joint
Resolution 1 with the support of every Republican Senator and a
5 See, e.g., Neville Nankivell, Combined Support from the Right Might Spur Balanced-
Budget Law, FIN. POST, Sept. 13, 1997, at 19 (quoting Senate Majority leader Trent
Lott's statement that "it's an issue that will not go away"); Ron Fournier, Texas
Governor a Rising Star for GOP, FRESNO BEE, Aug. 24, 1997, at A13 (citing George W.
Bush's continued support for the Amendment); William F. Weld, GOP Itself Bound
for Failure on Abortion Litmus Test, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 15, 1998, at 29 (containing
a statement by a prominent Republican that opposition to a Balanced Budget
Amendment is "outside the current mainstream of Republican orthodoxy").
6 See Darlene Superville, Gingrich Says House to Vote Again on Balanced Budget
Amendment, AP, May 5, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2522716 (quoting the House
Speaker's argument that the successful passage of a balanced budget agreement will
improve the Amendment's prospects for success).
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substantial number of Democrats When the votes were counted,
the Amendment (Hatch Amendment)8 fell one vote short of the
necessary two-thirds majority, just as it had in the previous
Congress.
The most important obstacle standing in the way of the
Balanced Budget Amendment's passage was concern over the
Amendment's impact on Social Security. In both the 104th and
105th Congresses, Democratic Senators who had campaigned on a
pro-Balanced Budget Amendment platform subsequently opposed
the Hatch Amendment. Overwhelmingly, they justified their
apparent "flip-flops" by arguing that the inclusion of the Old Age
Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI) 1° trust funds in the
balanced budget calculation would tempt subsequent Congresses
to trim Social Security benefits. Recently, these Senators have
correctly pointed out that a constitutional provision requiring
annual balance would prevent Congress from relying on
accumulated surpluses in the Social Security trust fund to finance
the baby boomers' benefits without securing super-majority
approval in Congress.12 To address this concern, Senator Byron
Dorgan has offered an alternative Balanced Budget Amendment
(Dorgan Amendment) that excludes the Social Security trust fund
7 See S.J. Res. 1, 105th Cong. (1997). Sixty-two original sponsors were listed on
the resolution. See id.
8 The Amendment is named for its primary sponsor, Senator Hatch.
' During the 104th Congress, however, the Amendment easily secured the two-
thirds necessary in the House. The Amendment also came within a few votes of
passage in 1986 and 1990. See S. REP. No. 105-3, at 4-6 (1997).
10 This is more commonly known as Social Security.
11 See, e.g, Jonathan Chait, Losing Balance, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 17, 1997, at 13
(analyzing the political motivations behind Democratic Senators' positions on the
Social Security trust fund exclusion during the 105th Congress); William G. Dauster,
Protecting Social Security and Medicare, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 462, 497 (1996) (offering
an insider's account of the stance of Democratic Senators towards the Social Security
exemption during the 104th Congress).
12 See Chait, supra note 11, at 13. Of course, the Social Security Trust Fund does
not exist as an unused "pot of money." Rather, its funds are being used to finance
current government borrowing, and the trust fund consists of Treasury obligations
to repay those loans. A Balanced Budget Amendment would, if enforced, eliminate
the need for such loans. However, because it would also prohibit government
outlays in excess of that year's receipts, it would treat the expenditure of
accumulated surpluses of the OASDI trust fund as ordinary outlays, which would
have to be offset by increased taxes or reduced spending elsewhere in the budget.
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from the balanced budget calculation. 3
Assuming that the Balanced Budget Amendment will one day
secure congressional passage and is ratified by the states, the
major issue to be resolved will be whether or not the Social
Security trust funds' surpluses or deficits should be counted
towards budgetary balance. There is reason to believe that an
amendment that exempts Social Security from the balance is most
likely to secure passage. 5 This was clearly the more popular option
in public opinion polls. On the other hand, only an amendment
that is silent on Social Security has ever won majority approval in
Congress. Accordingly, this article will examine the impact of a
Balanced Budget Amendment on the Social Security program in
each of two possible scenarios. The first scenario is that a
Balanced Budget Amendment that excludes Social Security is
ratified. The second scenario is that the existing Amendment,
which apparently counts Social Security surpluses towards
balance, is ratified. In either case, ratification would
fundamentally alter the nature of the Social Security program.
Moreover, the legislative history that has accumulated in the
debate over its enactment could help frame subsequent judicial
enforcement of the Amendment. 6
'3 See, e.g., S.J. Res. 12, 105th Cong. § 7 (1997); S.J. Res. 54, 104th Cong. § 7
(1996).
14 In 1997, ratification by the states appeared likely, but not without a fight.
According to a study by the Center for the Study of the States, 31 states were leaning
in favor of ratification, and only New York's legislature was solidly in opposition.
Seven of the remaining 18 states would need to ratify the Amendment in order to
win its passage. Seejim Gallagher, State's Side: Approval of Budget Amendment Doesn't
Stop at Congress, ST. Louis POST-DISPATcH, Mar. 2, 1997, at 5B.
1' See Balanced Budget Amendment. Hearings Before the House Judiciary Committee,
105th Cong. 8 (1997) (statement of Eugene Lehrmann, American Association of
Retired Persons) (citing a December 1996 NBC/WALL STREETJ. poll). In a recent
poll, 71% of Americans said that they felt the Balanced Budget Amendment should
include a provision prohibiting Congress from using the Social Security Trust Funds
to balance the budget.
16 There are a number of scholars who question whether judges should examine
legislative history when interpreting statutes. The current consensus appears to be
that legislative history remains a relevant, but not definitive, tool, although there is
ample disagreement. A fuller discussion is beyond the scope of this article, but for
an interesting contrast, compare ANTONIN ScALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997) (arguing that the use of legislative history in
interpreting statutes may be unconstitutional) with Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of
Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 845 (1992) (articulating a
rigorous defense of the use of legislative history). There is arguably still greater
1998]
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H. The Nature of the Judicial Process: Two Models ofJudicial
Enforcement
Judicial enforcement is one of the few aspects of the
Balanced Budget Amendment that has received significant
attention from legal scholars. 7 Unfortunately, all of the literature
discussing judicial involvement in the Balanced Budget
Amendment focuses on a case paradigm in which Congress
violates the spirit of the Amendment, and someone subsequently
files suit so as to prompt court-ordered compliance. These types
of hypothetical cases, interesting though they may be, are unlikely
to be heard by the federal courts. Courts reluctant to delve into
the realm of budgetary policy could concoct a number of
convincing rationales for refusing to decide such cases on the
merits. 8
On the other hand, scholars have devoted almost no
attention to cases that would arise from government reliance on
controversy over whether legislative history is relevant in interpreting constitutional
amendments. The problem is that in interpreting the legislative intent of
constitutional amendments judges must look not only at Congress' intentions, but
also at the intentions of the state legislatures that ratified them. Opponents of
legislative history argue that attempting to analyze all this information is likely to be
more confusing than helpful. See, e.g., Kenneth Starr, Observations About the Use of
Legislative History, 1987 DUKE LJ. 371. The most persuasive response to this
argument is that when a court interprets the Constitution, it had better do so
correctly. Unlike a judicial error in construing a statute's intent, which can be
corrected by clarifying legislation, a judicial error in construing the Constitution's
meaning can only be corrected by a subsequent constitutional amendment.
Therefore, courts can devote extra time and energy to assimilating the mountains of
evidence that speak to the framers' intent in the rare instances where they are called
upon to interpret a new amendment. See, e.g., Abner Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's
Observations, 1987 DUKE L.J. 380.
17 See, e.g., RICHARD BRIFFAULT, BALANCING ACTS: THE REAuTY BEHIND STATE
BALANCED BUDGET REQUIREMENTS (1996); James W. Bowen, Enforcing the Balanced
Budget Amendment, 4 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 565 (1994); Philip G. Joyce & Robert D.
Reischauer, Deficit Budgeting: The Federal Budget Process and Budget Reform, 29 HARv. J.
ON LEGIS. 429, 449 (1992); Theodore Seto, Drafting a Federal Balanced Budget
Amendment That Does What It Is Supposed to Do (and No More), 106 YALE L.J. 1449,
1506-14 (1997); Stewart E. Sterk & Elizabeth S. Goldman, Controlling Legislative
Shortsightedness: The Effectiveness of Constitutional Debt Limitations, 1991 Wis. L. REv.
1301 (1991); Donald Tobin, The Balanced Budget Amendment: Will Judges Become
Accountants? A Look at State Experiences, 12 J.L. & POL. 153 (1996); Gay Aynesworth
Crosthwait, Note, Article III Problems in Enforcing the Balanced Budget Amendment, 83
COLUM. L. REv. 1065 (1983); David Lubecky, Comment, The Proposed Federal Balanced
Budget Amendment: The Lesson from State Experience, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 563 (1986).
'8 See infra Part II.B.
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Balanced Budget Amendment-induced fiscal pressures resulting
from specific reductions or procedural changes that adversely
affect beneficiaries of government programs. This category of
cases would almost certainly prompt judicial interpretation of the
Amendment, as there would be little or no way for the courts to
consistently avoid reaching the constitutional questions. This
article shall refer to the initial category of cases as "macro-
enforcement" cases, because they would prompt the judiciary to
tackle the big fiscal picture, and the latter class as "micro-
enforcement" cases, because they would allow the judiciary to
decide the meaning of the Balanced Budget Amendment one
localized dispute at a time. This article will fill a gap in the
existing literature by discussing how the federal courts are likely to
deal with micro-enforcement cases, particularly those that might
arise in response to reductions in Social Security benefits.
A. BBA as a Sword: Macro-Enforcement and the Lack Thereof
Early efforts at examining judicial enforcement of the
Balanced Budget Amendment were limited to macro-enforcement
litigation. This analysis has framed not only subsequent
scholarship, but Congress' understanding of the Amendment's
judicial enforcement as well.' 9  Three barriers to judicial
enforcement have been identified: lack of plaintiff standing;20 the
political question doctrine;2' and problems in crafting judicial
remedies.
Any plaintiff seeking to enforce the Balanced Budget
Amendment against congressional circumvention would have to
overcome daunting barriers in order to gain standing. For the
courts to enforce the Balanced Budget Amendment, a plaintiff
would need to bring suit against a government official, alleging
non-compliance. To gain standing in federal courts, that plaintiff
would have to demonstrate 1) injury in fact, 2) causation, and 3)
redressability.
21
19 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 105-3, at 11 (1997) (discussing the same three limitations
on justiciability that Crosthwait articulated in her 1983 article).
20 See Crosthwait, supra note 17, at 1073-82.
21 See Crosthwait, supra note 17, at 1083-89.
22 See Crosthwait, supra note 17, at 1090-04.
23 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
1998] 519
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If a Balanced Budget Amendment were ratified, and
Congress attempted to circumvent it, several types of plaintiffs
might file macro-enforcement suits. A suit by a citizen with a
generalized interest in preventing the nonobservance of the
Constitution would not meet the standing threshold, because a
24
court would deem such an injury too abstract and attenuated.
Suits by individual members of Congress would also fail to
establish standing, because the Supreme Court has recently
demonstrated its reluctance to grant standing in such cases due to
concerns that it might be drawn into a politicized dispute that
forces it to take sides among factions in a co-equal branch.2 A suit
by a special interest group with a traditional commitment to
balanced budgets would be no more likely to pass the standing
threshold than a lawsuit filed by its individual, tax-paying
members. A class action lawsuit, filed on behalf of children,
would also probably fail to pass the standing threshold . A suit by
24 SeeValley Forge Christian College v. American United, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 482
(1982).
25 See Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312, 2324-25 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring)
(cautioning against judicial intervention in a dispute between the President and a
minority in Congress over the constitutionality of the line item veto).
26 See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 (1972). An example of such a
special interest group is the Concord Coalition.
27 See R. George Wright, The Interests of Posterity in the Constitutional Scheme, 59 U.
CIN. L. REv. 113, 144-46 (1990). Children, in the aggregate, could probably
demonstrate to a court's satisfaction that deficit spending adversely affected their
economic interests, disproportionately to the harm that would be inflicted upon all
taxpayers. For an analysis of the burdens that "deficit" spending places on younger
cohorts, see Laurence Kotlikoff and Jagadeesh Gokhale, Passing the Generational Buck:
Government Policy for Children, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, Jan. 1994, at 73. However, some
children such as those who are severely disabled or destined to become severely
disabled, would probably be harmed more by the spending cuts necessary to reach
budgetary balance than by any savings resulting from decreased national debt. In
certifying a class action for litigation purposes, courts must decide that "the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." See
FED. R- Crv. P. 23(a) (4). Thus, predicted future divergent interests among children
could dissuade a judge from certifying a class of children, even if, in the aggregate,
reducing the debt would improve their lives. This uncertainty about whether
individual children would benefit from or be burdened by an unbalanced budget
may also prevent ajudge from giving standing to a single child plaintiff. Finally, the
courts could decide that the potential injuries to children resulting from deficit
spending would occur so far in the future that such cases were note yet ripe for
judicial intervention. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438
U.S. 59, 81 (1978); see also National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 101
F.3d 1423, 1431 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that ripeness doctrine required dismissal
1998] BALANCED BUDGET AMENDMENT
taxpayers would have a somewhat higher likelihood of success, but
under the Supreme Court's standing precedents, a court could
281
easily justify a denial of standing.
In deciding whether to grant standing, the courts could
supplement their survey of case law by exploring the legislative
history of the Balanced Budget Amendment. While the
congressional attitude towards standing is rather murky, courts
would probably glean that the legislature foresaw limited judicial
enforcement. The Senate Committee Report speaks repeatedly of
preventing "undu[e] involve[ment]" by the courts, while
preserving the courts' responsibility to say "what the law is."3° On
the standing issue, however, the Committee Report suggests that
under the Lujan test, it would be a heavy burden for a litigant to
demonstrate something more concrete than simply a "generalized
grievance" reflective of the burden shared by all taxpayers."'
However, this analysis does not encapsulate Congress'
understanding of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence;" more
of challenge by federal employees union to constitutionality of line item veto act
because the effects of the congressional act were not yet felt in a concrete way by the
challenging parties).
28 See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1968). Taxpayer standing is
appropriate where a logical link exists between the plaintiffs status as a taxpayer and
the type of legislative enactment challenged, and where the taxpayer can establish a
"nexus between that status and the precise nature of constitutional infringement
alleged." Id. Where the Constitution prescribes a specific limit on federal spending,
as it would under the Balanced Budget Amendment, the taxpayer might gain
standing. See Crosthwait, supra note 17, at 1079. But see S. REP. NO. 105-3, at 12
(1997) (containing the Senate Judiciary Committee's assessment of taxpayer suits as
unlikely to surpass the standing threshold); cf Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982)
(suggesting that taxpayer standing is only appropriate when a spending law is
enacted pursuant to the Taxing and Spending Clause of the Constitution).
I The other contextual resource that courts might look to - experience in the
states - suggests that state courts have been reluctant to grant plaintiff standing in
macro-enforcement suits. See infra text accompanying note 71. This is so even
though state courts frequently have more lenient standing requirements than their
federal counterparts. See, e.g., Nicholl v. E-470 Pub. Highway Auth., 896 P.2d 859,
866 (Colo. 1995) (en banc) (holding that taxpayers have standing to enjoin an
unlawful expenditure of public funds).
30 S. REP. No. 105-3, at 10.
31 Id. at 11.
32 In hearings held on the justiciability of the Balanced Budget Amendment, the
Judiciary Committee heard from a number of prominent constitutional scholars who
argued that the Amendment would inevitably find its way into the federal courts.
See, e.g., Balanced Budget Amendment Senate Joint Resolution 41, 103rd Cong., 2d
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likely, it is a suggestion of how the Judiciary Committee thinks the
courts should address standing concerns." Additionally, while the
Committee Report suggests coldness towards active judicial
enforcement, other types of legislative history give the opposite
indication. For example, during the 103rd Congress, the
Balanced Budget Amendment that was narrowly rejected by the
Senate included the Danforth Amendment, which limited the
Court's role in enforcement to issuing declaratory judgments.34
However, the subsequent Congress' equivalent to the Danforth
Amendment was dropped from the bill when it failed by a vote of
fifty-two to forty-seven. Further, there are signs in the legislative
history that a few sponsors of the Balanced Budget Amendment
envisioned active enforcement of the Amendment by the courts,
rather than the use of standing restrictions as a means of avoiding
Balanced Budget Amendment-related issues. 6 The result of this
conflicting legislative history is a constitutional delegation to
future decision makers. Congress either does not have the votes
to pass an Amendment that takes a position on judicial
enforcement, s or feels it presently does not have sufficient
information to judge whether such enforcement is desirable, and
would prefer to address the matter later through legislation
implementing the Amendment 9  or jurisdiction-stripping. 4°
Sess. 423 at 186 (statement of Kathleen Sullivan, Professor, Stanford Law School); id.
at 193 (statement of Burke Marshall, Professor, Yale Law School); Constitutional
Amendment to Balance the Budget, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 693, at 5 (statement of
Laurence Tribe, Professor, Harvard Law School).
33 While it might find Congress' anticipation of subsequent judicial involvement
relevant, the Supreme Court would by no means defer to a committee's
understanding of case law.
34 For a more elaborate discussion of the Danforth Amendment and its
indications of legislative intent, see Tobin, supra note 17, at 176-78.
35 See Tobin, supra note 17, at 178. The 105th Congress has also chosen not to
incorporate Danforth's language. At a minimum, this decision means that Congress
wants to give the courts or future Congresses leeway to decide the nature of judicial
enforcement. Alternatively, it could be viewed as an implicit approval of the courts'
use of injunctive relief in enforcing the Amendment.
36 See Tobin, supra note 17, at 174 (citing Senators Simon and Mack and
Representative Schaefer as influential proponents ofjudicial involvement).
17 See generally Neil Komesar, Back to the Future-An Institutional View of Marking
and Interpreting Constitutions, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 191 (1987).
38 See Tobin, supra note 17, at 183.
31 Section 6 of the Hatch Amendment provides that "[tihe Congress shall
enforce and implement this article by appropriate legislation." See S.J. Res. 1, 105th
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Alternatively, a future Congress could, by statute, create standing
for certain plaintiffs to file suit to enforce the Amendment.
One alternative that has not been discussed in the case law,
academic literature or legislative history is a suit by the Social
Security trustees to protect the trust funds from being used to
offset the deficit. 1  If standing obstacles were the only
impediments to a federal court's consideration of a macro-
enforcement claim, the trustees would have a strong case.
Perhaps the framers of the Balanced Budget Amendment would
consider a suit by the trustees of a federal trust fund to be
consistent with the notion of limited judicial involvement in the
Amendment's enforcement. Given their fiduciary duty to
maintain the trust fund's solvency, the trustees would have the
most logical claim among all possible plaintiffs to gain standing.
A decision to use trust fund monies for non-Social Security
42purposes would surely cause an "injury in fact" to the fund. On
the other hand, prudential factors could still allow the courts to
avoid reaching the constitutional merits of the case. The Social
Security Trustees consist of three Cabinet Members sitting ex
Cong. § 6 (1997). Of course, this does not make Congress the sole enforcer of the
Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment has similar language, and yet the courts
have not hesitated to enforce its provisions. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
40 The Constitution provides that Congress may limit the jurisdiction of the
courts by statute, thereby preventing them from hearing certain types of cases. See
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. Whether this power could allow the Congress to
withdraw all jurisdiction over the Balanced Budget Amendment from the federal
courts is an open question. See generally Laurence Tribe,Jurisdictional Gerrymandering:
Zoning Disfavored Rights out of the Federal Courts, 16 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 129
(1981).
41 Such a suit could also be brought by the Medicare Trustees or the trustees of
another federal trust fund. However, as I shall later argue, those suits would be
unlikely to succeed on the merits because of the Hatch Amendment's framers'
decision to include all expenditures in the budget calculation. Similarly, a suit by
the Social Security Trustees would probably not succeed if the Hatch Amendment
were to pass. Therefore, because a suit by the Social Security Trustees after the
ratification of the Dorgan Amendment is the case that presents the strongest
justification for judicial macro-enforcement, that is the situation I consider here.
42 Indeed, on an analogous set of facts, Arizona's Supreme Court agreed to hear
a case filed by the trustees of the state's worker's compensation fund, challenging a
special tax that the legislature assessed against the fund in order to balance the
budget. See generally State Compensation Fund v. Symington, 848 P.2d 273 (Ariz.
1993) (en banc). In that case, the court ruled that the tax was unconstitutional
"special legislation," something akin to a bill of attainder that singled out a single
entity for taxation. See id. at 279.
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officio,4 and two Presidential appointees." Thus, a lawsuit filed by
the trustees would likely take on the dimensions of a political
conflict between the President and Congress. Given this
possibility, the political question doctrine would figure
prominently in the minds of potential judicial enforcers.
Indeed, even if a court were to grant standing, it could still
refuse to reach the merits of a macro-enforcement case because of
the political question doctrine. The court may decline a case
under the political question doctrine if. (1) the issue is
constitutionally committed to a coordinate political department;
or (2) there are a lack of judicially manageable standards for
resolving it; or (3) the issue is impossible to decide without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or (4) the courts may not resolve the issue without
expressing disrespect for a coordinate political branch; or (5) the
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made is
required; or (6) potential embarrassment may arise from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.4 5  In the case of enforcing a Balanced Budget
Amendment, all these factors, save perhaps the fifth, could pose
particularly forbidding barriers to judicial intervention. Only the
most confident of courts would dare to limit Congress' power of
the purse. Also, a court might feel it lacks the institutional
competence to analyze competing estimates concerning revenue
and outlays and determine which is most accurate. 46 Finally, many
of the decisions a court would have to make in macro-enforcing
the Amendment would be of the type best settled by a body
designed to facilitate a consensus, rather than by an institution
41 See Social Security Act § 201(c) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 401(c) (1997). These Cabinet
Members are the Secretaries of Labor, Health and Human Services, and the
Treasury. See id.
44 See id. The President is to appoint two members of the public, who serve four-
year terms after Senate confirmation. These two members are to be from different
political parties. See id. As a practical matter, this means that one of the two will be
from the President's party. The result is that when combined with the three Cabinet
Members, at least four-fifths of the Trustees will be perceived as loyal to the
President.
45 SeeBakerv. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
46 See John Patrick Hagan, Judicial Enforcement of a Balanced-Budget Amendment:
Legal and Institutional Constraints, 15 POL'Y STUDIESJ. 247, 250 (1986); see also Bowen,
supra note 17, at 600-08.
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that aspires to administer impartial justice.
Federal courts might also turn to state case law precedents to
determine whether macro-enforcement of the Balanced Budget
Amendment is consistent with the political question doctrine.
Forty-nine states have some sort of balanced budget requirement,
either by statute or constitutional provision. In trying to
understand the context in which the Balanced Budget
Amendment would have been ratified, federal courts would likely
supplement their analysis of congressional history with a survey of
state experiences.48 After all, thirty-eight state legislatures would
need to ratify the Amendment, and it is likely that in envisioning
how a federal amendment would operate, state legislators' views
would be framed by their own states' experiences with enforcing
balanced budget provisions.
Recently, the Connecticut Supreme Court declined to
become involved in the macro-enforcement of a constitutional
balanced budget provision. In Nielsen v. State,49 a group of
concerned citizens sued the legislature, seeking to force its
compliance with a balanced budget constitutional amendment
that had been approved by the state's voters.5° The Connecticut
Constitution provides for strict guidelines concerning budget
expenditure increases by the state legislature. 5' Moreover, the
constitution also provides that the legislature is to define the
terms "increase in personal income," "increase in inflation," and
"general budget expenditures" for the purposes of these
guidelines. 2 Three years after the voters' ratification of the
See Lubecky, supra note 17, at 564. Vermont is the single state with no balance
requirement. See id.
48 Federal courts could conceivably examine the state legislatures' debates on
ratification, but poring over such a vast amount of material might prove
prohibitively burdensome. Because many states' courts have never heard macro-
enforcement suits, an examination of state case law is relatively manageable.
'9 670 A.2d 1288 (Conn. 1996).
50 SeeCoNN. CONST. art. III, § 18.
51 See id. The constitution provides that the "general assembly shall not
authorize an increase in general budget expenditures for any fiscal year above the
amount of general budget expenditures authorized for the previous fiscal year by a
percentage which exceeds the greater of the percentage increase in personal
income or the percentage increase in inflation ...." unless the governor and three-
fifths of the members of each house agree to exceed the limit. Id. § 18(b).
52 Id.
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amendment, the legislature had still not defined the three terms,
effectively rendering the balanced budget provision impotent."
3
The court held that the amendment contained a textual
commitment giving the General Assembly exclusive authority to
define its terms.54 Accordingly, the court refused to define those
terms, even though doing so would give immediate operative
effect to the constitutional provision. The court held that
defining such terms was an act requiring political judgment rather
than judicial scrutiny.5 Moreover, the court refused to order the
legislature to define those terms, because doing so would create a
conflict with a coequal branch of government. 56  The court
explicitly held that the political question doctrine rendered
enforcement of the state constitution's balanced budget
amendment nonjusticiable.57
In sharp contrast, the Alaska Supreme Court has adopted an
interventionist approach in defining the terms of the state's
constitutional balanced budget provision. In Hickel v. Cowper,58 the
court heard a suit filed by the state's former governor against his
successor, charging that the new governor and legislature had
passed a statute that incorrectly defined the terms "amount
available for appropriation" and "amount appropriated for the
previous fiscal year. 59 Inexplicably, the state's Attorney General
did not argue that the court should decline to hear the case
because of standing limitations or the political question
53 See Nielsen, 670 A.2d at 1290. Six of the seven judges of the supreme court
signed onto the majority opinion. See id. The lone concurrence argued that while
the issue was not a political question, the legislature had not been given sufficient
time to enact the required implementing legislation. See id. at 1296 (Berdon, J.,
concurring).
54 See id. at 1291.
55 See id. at 1294. But see In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor-State Revenue
Cap, 658 So.2d 77, 81 (Fla. 1995) (articulating the Florida Supreme Court's advisory
opinion that the courts would be able to define "revenue" in absence of legislation
doing so). The best explanation for the Florida Supreme Court's contrary take on
the question is that it was invited by a coordinate branch to participate, rather than
asked by a third party to overrule, a coordinate branch's decision. This explanation,
if true, would lend additional support to the micro-enforcement theory proposed in
Section HI-B, infra.
56 See id. at 1291.
57 See id. at 1292.
58 874 P.2d 922 (Alaska 1994).
59 Id. at 923.
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doctrine."°  The court then rejected both parties' proposed
definitions, and delved into the text of the constitution, debates
on its enactment, voter pamphlets from the constitutional
referendum, and a number of dictionaries to discern what the
terms "objectively" meant.61
Other state courts that have been asked to enforce their state
balanced budget requirements against legislative circumvention
have ruled in a manner more consistent with Connecticut's view
than with Alaska's. The New York Court of Appeals confronted a
question regarding redefinition of debt in Wein v. Carey.62 The
New York legislature was authorized to balance the budget by
issuing short-term notes to cover shortfalls incurred mid-year. In
Wein, a taxpayer sued to prevent the legislature from employing
this practice year after year, by re-defining previously incurred
debts as a mid- ear shortfall, and annually issuing new notes to
cover the gap. The court unanimously declared that it could
prohibit the legislature from issuing the debt, but only if the
plaintiff could prove that the legislature acted with an improper
intent to manipulate the budget process.6 In this instance, it
found that the legislature's conduct did not amount to such
manipulation. This choice of standards, while less deferential to
the legislature than that adopted by the Connecticut court, meant
that New York courts would intervene in only the most egregious
of circumstances, such as where the legislature predicted a
tripling of personal income tax revenue estimates, in the absence
of a tax rate change, during a recession. Otherwise, the courts
would shy away from the "practical monstrosity" of udicially
reviewing the accuracy of an eleven billion dollar budget.
60 While the state did not argue that the court should have refused to hear the
case on prudential grounds, it did assert that the court should adopt a "strong
presumption" in favor of the legislature's interpretations. Id. at 925. This the court
refused to do, arguing that despite the legislature's greater familiarity with
appropriations, it was "not institutionally competent to issue opinions as to what a
statute passed by an earlier legislature meant." Id. at 927 n.7.
61 See id. at 927-36.
62 362 N.E.2d 587 (N.Y. 1977).
63 See id. at 588-90.
64 See id. at 592.
65 See id.
6 See id.
67 362 N.E.2d at 591.
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A similar taxpayer suit in Maryland sought to question the
legislature's authority to rely on allegedly optimistic forecasts to
create a balanced budget.68 The trial court refused to second-
guess the legislature as to whether estimated revenues resulting
from contingent events could be counted as revenues for the sake69
of balance. A few months later, the appellate court dismissed the
case as moot after the projected revenue estimates turned out not
to be optimistic. Most instructively, even in Massachusetts, where
the state's balanced budget law specifically provides a mechanism
forjudicial enforcement, the high court has declined to engage in
judicial review. ° Furthermore, it is important to note that the
cases discussed herein are among the few in which courts have
allowed plaintiffs to pass beyond the initial standing barriers in
order to make an argument for judicial enforcement. The
overwhelming majority of instances of objectionable budget
balancing do not result in any level of judicial intervention.7'
Thus, a holistic analysis of these cases suggests that the Alaska
decision is merely an interesting, albeit misguided, aberration,
and that most courts view macro-enforcement of balanced budget
provisions as an opening shot in an unwelcome turf war with the
legislature over the power of the purse. Thus, it can be safely
presumed that most of the state legislators who would ratify any
federal Balanced Budget Amendment would perceive it as a
mechanism not susceptible to judicial macro-enforcement, absent
any clear language to the contrary in the text of the Amendment.
72
Finally, even if the Court found a macro-enforcement claim
to be consistent with the standing and political question
doctrines, the case could still be doomed because of remedial
problems. Perhaps simple declaratory relief emerging from the
Supreme Court would be enough to convince Congress to enforce
the Constitution. Such was the case in a previous separation of
powers case in which the two branches might have engaged in an
68 See Bishop v. Governor, 380 A.2d 220 (Md. App. 1977).
69 See id. at 222.
70 See Town of Brookline v. Governor, 553 N.E.2d 1277, 1281 (Mass. 1990).
71 See BRIFFAULT, supra note 17, at 39.
72 Indeed, even if the Federal Amendment does contain authorization for
judicial enforcement, the Massachusetts legislature probably still would believe that
the federal courts would choose not to enforce the Amendment. See supra text
accompanying note 70.
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inter-branch showdown.7" However, in an area as dear to
Congress as its spending authority, congressional resistance to a
court's declaratory decree could force a court to grant an
injunction enjoining any executive official from spending funds.
Such an injunction could create serious logistical difficulties for
the courts, which would then be responsible for overseeing the
massive federal fiscal apparatus." As for forcing a legislature to
raise taxes, the Supreme Court has declared that this remedy
offends the Constitution.75 Alternatively, it is conceivable that
Congress would simply ignore judicial meddling in fiscal affairs via
injunctive relief, precipitating a constitutional crisis. The risk of
precipitating either unfortunate outcome might convince the
judiciary to take a "hands off' approach to the Balanced Budget
Amendment.
Given this remedial nightmare, as well as the standing and
political question doctrine issues, there is good reason to doubt
whether these types of Balanced Budget Amendment cases would
ever be adjudicated in the federal courts. Courts would be
unsympathetic to cases in which they would be called upon to
craft complex remedies, because such cases would require
76
ongoing judicial supervision of a coordinate branch . Macro-
enforcement litigation would most likely focus on deciding
narrow, technical questions that are unlikely to precipitate a
serious separation of powers conflict. 77 Judicial involvement in
73 See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 550 (1969) (holding that
congressional exclusion of one of its members was unconstitutional).
74 See Crosthwait, supra note 17, at 1098-1100.
75 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 55 (1990) (holding that District Court
could not impose a tax increase itself, but it could require a state legislature to raise
additional revenues to fulfill a constitutional mandate if the legislature was allowed
flexibility in selecting the means of doing so).
76 This would render unlikely a situation where Congress passed an unbalanced
budget, and a court ordered it to try again.
77 Such technical judgments could relate to issues such as whether the President
could submit two budgets (one balanced, the other not) to Congress under Section
Three of the Balanced Budget Amendment. Section Three reads: "Prior to each
fiscal year, the President shall submit to the Congress a proposed budget for the
United States Government for that fiscal year, in which total outlays do not exceed
total receipts." S.J. Res. 1, 105th Cong. § 3 (1997). Another technical dispute could
arise over whether Section Four's requirement that "no bill to increase revenue shall
become law unless approved by a majority of the whole number of each house by a
rollcall vote" applied to relatively innocuous revenue increases such as increased
user fees and postage hikes. Id. § 4. This hypothesized judicial preference for cases
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these types of cases would be consistent with the Senate
Committee Report's statement that the judiciary would have
limited involvement in enforcing the Amendment.
78
B. BBA as a Shield: Micro-Enforcement
While Congress has in its legislative history devoted
significant attention to the macro-enforcement of the Balanced
Budget Amendment, it has given almost no consideration to
micro-enforcement contexts in which the Amendment could
affect litigation. Specifically, this refers to cases not involving
congressional circumvention in which judges would nevertheless
be called upon to interpret the Amendment. A non-government
plaintiff would for the reasons previously discussed have a difficult
time convincing the courts to force Congress to cut spending or
raise taxes in order to balance the budget. On the other hand,
the courts would be willing to entertain an argument by
government defendants that they were forced by the Hatch
Balanced Budget Amendment to cut Mr. Nestor's Social Security
benefits or Mr. Eldridge's disability insurance benefits. 9 Similarly,
if the Dorgan Balanced Budget Amendment were ratified,
plaintiffs Nestor and Eldridge could assert that they were denied
payments in violation of their due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Dorgan Amendment's
of less than earth-shaking import would lead one to predict that judicial intervention
might not be forthcoming in a dispute over whether Social Security was included in
the deficit under the Hatch Amendment. On the other hand, in cases of egregious
congressional behavior, the courts would feel pressured to intervene. For example,
assume that the Congress decided to count the Social Security surpluses towards
reducing the deficit until the year 2018. Then assume that Congress decided by
statute that the Social Security deficit that would appear in 2019 would not be
counted towards balance. Such an action would so clearly violate the spirit and
legislative intent of the Amendment that the courts might set aside the political
question doctrine. Moreover, the Supreme Court's declaratory judgment,
combined with public sentiment, would probably convince Congress to reverse its
previous decision, thereby mitigating remedial conflicts. Under these
circumstances, if a plaintiff could successfully gain standing in the federal courts, the
judiciary. might vigilantly enforce the Amendment. However, these cases would
hopefully be few and far between.
78 See S. REP. No. 105-3, at 10-11 (1997).
7 The reference here is to the plaintiffs in the landmark Flemming v. Nestor and
Mathews v. Eldridge decisions, discussed infra at notes 135-148 and accompanying
text.
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purported additional protections of those property rights.0 Faced
with these kinds of cases, the courts would have a difficult time
avoiding a decision on the merits of the Balanced Budget
Amendment claims. Certainly, the court could not avoid these
cases by using standing, political question, or remedial concerns,
any more than they could when these plaintiffs brought their
81
cases.
It is precisely in these types of cases that most state courts
have intervened and adjudicated issues relating to the state
812balanced budget provisions. What many writers have failed to
realize is that these sword and shield cases actually represent two
distinct models of judicial enforcement, with entirely different
incentives, political realities, and doctrinal frameworks. This
article will now proceed to extrapolate these state law
developments to the federal level.
If either version of the Balanced Budget Amendment is
ratified, the government will eventually make significant spending
cuts. Whether those reductions are made through legislative
decisions to modify benefit levels for certain classes of
beneficiaries, or through administrative decisions to deny or
reduce benefits to the "least deserving," some of those recipients
will file suit, seeking a restoration of benefits. Inevitably,
government lawyers representing coordinate branches will begin
making powerful arguments about the constitutional significance
80 See infra text accompanying notes 180-184.
81 The plaintiffs have standing by virtue of their suffering a real and direct loss,
i.e., losing benefits. The cases do not run afoul of the political question doctrine
because they involve basic, localized decisions about what the Constitution means
and whether someone is entitled, as a matter of right, to specific benefits. Courts
have a long history of making these decisions. Finally, the remedy demanded-the
restoration of benefits-would easily fall within the power of even the lowliest of
administrative law courts.
82 See BRIFFAULT, supra note 17, at 36-37. Richard Briffault notes this trend in
state adjudication:
In all of these cases, the balanced budget language has been cited as a
justification for a cutback, nonpayment, or transfer of funds. In other
words, the balanced budget requirement has been a shield, used by a
governor or state to defend against a claim that a belt-tightening action
violates some legal right of persons affected by it .... But constitutional
mandates have only rarely been deployed as a sword to compel a state to
balance its budget or force a state to defend its assertion that its budget is
balanced.
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of fiscal discipline. Once that process begins and those lawyers
begin asking the courts to interpret the Balanced Budget
Amendment, the political question doctrine will no longer
constrain judicial interpretation. Deferring to the wishes of a
coordinate branch will entail judicial intervention. Since standing
and remedial difficulties will simply not come into play in these
types of cases, a body of law relating to the meaning of the
Amendment will begin to develop. 3
One can imagine several types of micro-enforcement actions
that could arise under the Hatch Amendment. For example,
Congress could pass implementing legislation that establishes a
sequestration process, whereby certain categories of appropriated
spending are subject to automatic, across-the-board cuts if mid-
year adjustments are required to keep the budget balanced.
Congress adopted such a mechanism in the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings Act. Such sequestration might prompt reduced
payments to a number of parties. This article will compare three
hypothetical cases: disputes involving a missed payment that the
government was contractually bound to make to a third party; a
lower-than-anticipated payment to a state that is expecting block
grant reimbursement for a welfare program; and a reduction in
Social Security benefits."'
If the Balanced Budget Amendment caused the government
to fail to make a payment to a contractor, the federal courts would
likely be quite sympathetic to a suit brought by that contractor .
6
In three recent state court cases, governors have unsuccessfully
invoked balanced budget requirement-related fiscal pressures as a
83 This raises an interesting question: if the courts begin to wet their feet on the
Balanced Budget Amendment by interpreting it in micro-enforcement entitlement
cases, would they then be more likely to "progress" to macro-enforcement decisions?
An affirmative answer certainly seems plausible, although plaintiff standing
constraints would remain a significant barrier to such suits.
84 See Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No.
99-177, 99 Stat. 1038, codified at 2 U.S.C. § 901 (explained in Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 714, 717-19 (1986)).
8 Other cases could arise in which the federal government might seek to use the
Balanced Budget Amendment as a shield against individual claims for damages. For
example, it could use the Balanced Budget Amendment to justify capping the
government's tort liability. See, e.g., Pfost v. State, 713 P.2d 495, 504 (Mont. 1986).
86 See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986). The Supreme Court has
already held that such an injury forms an adequate basis for a plaintiff to gain
standing in a suit challenging the sequestration. See id.
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defense against suits for breach of contract. The Florida Supreme
Court held that while the state constitution's balanced budget
requirement gives the legislature a great deal of leeway to deal
with budgetary shortfalls, the legislature may only breach
contracts if it can demonstrate a compelling interest."' In order to
do so, the state must be able to show that the funds are not
available from a more "reasonable" source, such as the reduction
of a non-contractual appropriation or a revenue-increasing88
measure. Distinguishing this type of case from a macro-
enforcement case, the court held that separation of powers
concerns would not prevent the courts from enforcing a valid
contract entered into by the legislature.89 Similarly, the Iowa
Supreme Court has rejected an assertion by the governor that the
existence of a balanced budget statute means that the state's
power to withhold appropriations must be read into every
contract.9° Finally, in a Washington case involving an economic
emergency precipitated by a recession, the state supreme court
ruled that the government's cancellation of teacher salary
increases required by a collective bargaining agreement was an
unconstitutional impairment of contract.9' The court held that
economic emergency may in fact be considered, but that it is just
another factor within the overall determination of
reasonableness. 2  Thus, the consensus among the few
jurisdictions that have considered the issue is that a constitutional
obligation to balance the budget will not trump the government's
contractual obligations unless the government has noS 93
alternative. Because the federal government has so many
87 SeeChiles v. United Faculty of Fla., 615 So. 2d 671, 673 (Fla. 1993).
88 See id. at 674 (Grimes, J., concurring).
89 See id. at 673. Specifically, the separation of powers concern referred to here
is the political question doctrine.
90 SeeA.F.S.C.M.E./Iowa Council 61 v. State, 484 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Iowa 1992).
"' See Carlstrom v. State, 694 P.2d 1, 7 (Wash. 1985).
92 See id, at 5. "Financial necessity, though superficially compelling, has never
been sufficient of itself to permit states to abrogate contracts." Id.
93 The only jurisdiction that apparently has adopted a conflicting ruling has
done so by declaring the government's collective bargaining agreement with public
employees to be essentially non-contractual. The Rhode Island Supreme Court held
that the Governor had the ability to shut down the government for ten days in order
to comply with a balanced budget requirement. See In re State Employees' Unions,
587 A.2d 919, 924 (R.I. 1991). However, the Court did this because it assumed that
the shutdown did not conflict with the public employees' contract. See id.
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potential sources of revenue at its disposal, including the powers
to tax, sell assets, and even print more money, the federal courts
seem unlikely to rule that the Balanced Budget Amendment is an
adequate shield against contractual breaches.
There is little state case law analogous to a situation that
might arise if the federal government used the Balanced Budget
Amendment to justify a sequestration of funds that were to be
used for block grants to the states. The relationship between
municipal governments and state governments do not completely
correspond to that between the federal and state governments,
but it remains the closest comparison available. In a notable
example of fiscal conflict between state and local governments,
the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to force the governor to
comply with statutory provisions requiring that he allocate funds
to county and municipal governments.9 The court held that a
constitutional balanced budget requirement took precedence
over a statutory obligation to provide certain funds to local
governments. 95 Similarly, the Michigan Supreme Court held that
the governor could reduce aid to local governments in order to
fulfill a constitutional obligation to balance the budget.96 This
case law suggests that federal courts might give serious
consideration to an argument made by the federal government
that the Balanced Budget Amendment forced it to reduce block
grant aid to the states. State plaintiffs might try to cast the
commitment of funds for block grants as contractual
relationships, but they would face an uphill battle. Especially if
the federal courts adopted the state courts' skepticism towards
governmental breach of contract, the courts would not be prone
to hold that reducing block grants was also an unreasonable way
of reaching balance. After all, were the opposite true, then the
14 See Camden v. Byrne, 411 A.2d 462, 464-66, 474 (NJ. 1980); see also Lubecky,
supra note 17, at 576-77 (detailing how the court held that the determination of the
amount of state funds to be appropriated to local governments was the obligation of
the legislature rather than the judiciary).
9- See Byrne, 411 A.2d at 464-74.
96 See Michigan Ass'n of Counties v. Department of Management and Budget,
345 N.W.2d 584, 593 (Mich. 1984). "The distribution schedule of the State Revenue
Sharing Act must give way to constitutional mandates and efforts to preserve the
fiscal integrity of the state." Id. at 589 (citing White v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 174 N.W.
2d 315 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969)).
97 Cf id. at 591.
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federal government could plausibly argue that it had been left
only with the options of cutting entidements or raising taxes,8
and thus be able to blame the courts for forcing it to choose
between such unpopular options.
This analysis raises this article's principal issue of how the
federal courts would respond to micro-enforcement suits by
plaintiffs seeking to bar the government from reducing their
Social Security benefits or weakening the procedural
requirements that protect those benefits. To a great degree, the
answer depends on which version of the Balanced Budget
Amendment is ratified, and how the courts interpret the language
of that Amendment. Therefore, in order to give a satisfactory
response, it will be necessary to broaden the inquiry, exploring
the historical context of the relationship between Social Security
and the balanced budget, the legislative history looming behind
the dueling proposed Amendments, and the experience of the
state courts in confronting similar problems.
HI. The Odd Couple: Social Security and the Balanced Budget
Theodore Seto aptly characterizes the Balanced Budget
Amendment as a strange marriage of accounting and
constitutional law. 9  By this he means that few scholars are
comfortable discussing both fields, resulting in a fragmented
understanding of how the Amendment would operate. The
joining of the Social Security (OASDI) trust fund with the rest of
the federal budget is a similarly difficult relationship. By nearly
unanimous consensus, it is agreed that the two should be kept
separate, and yet they keep finding their way back to each other.
The Hatch Balanced Budget Amendment proposal, which would
To adopt the reasoning of the plaintiffs and the minority [that assistance to
local governments could not be reduced to meet the balance requirement]
would mean that the Governor would have to reduce expenditures from less
than half of the revenue sources, doubling the financial burden on the
reduced areas.
Id.
98 Technically, the government could also run inflationary monetary policies or
sell assets to balance the budget. However, the former would be widely viewed as
economically and politically counter-productive, while the latter could only be
sustained for a short while. Therefore, as a practical matter, only two options would
remain.
I See Seto, supra note 17, at 1453.
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re-unify the budget, represents yet another volley in a tennis
match that has occupied the last two decades of congressional
budgetary history.
Prior to 1969, the federal government's trust funds, of which
OASDI is the largest, were accounted for separately from the
official, "administrative" budget.00  However, a Presidential
Commission on Budget Concepts was concerned that the
exclusion of the trust funds prevented the budget from accurately
reflecting the scope of government activity. As a result, beginning
in 1969, the President began including the trust funds in the
budget. Five years later, Congress also moved to a unified
budget. 10' However, when Congress subsequently voted to trim
the Social Security minimum benefit in order to reduce the
deficit, Social Security advocates began to believe that continued
inclusion in the budget would prompt further benefit
reductions.' ° The Social Security Amendments of 1983 removed
Social Security, as well as Medicare, from the unified budget,
effective in 1993.203 In the interim, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
Deficit Reduction Act modified that arrangement. Social Security
was removed from the budget, but its surpluses were used to offset
the deficit.'04 Within five years, the relationship would be altered
yet again. The Budget Enforcement Act prohibited the President
and Congress from including Social Security in the federal budget
deficit or surplus.' °5  However, in his budget proposals to
Congress, the President generally ignored this statute, and
included the Social Security surplus in his more prominent
displays of the budget deficit.'06 By 1996, congressional leaders
had followed suit, and proposed a balanced budget that was only
balanced if Social Security surpluses were included.
The treatment of Social Security has an enormous effect on
100 Dauster, supra note 11, at 487.
101 See Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (1974) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§
601-607 and scattered sections of 1 U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C. (1994)).
102 See Dauster, supra note 11, at 488.
103 See Dauster, supra note 11, at 489.
1(4 See AARON WILDAVSKY, THE NEW POLICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROcEss 279 (2d
ed. 1992).
105 See Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, § 13301(a), 104 Stat. 1388; see also
Dauster, supra note 11, at 494.
106 See Dauster, supra note 11, at 495.
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the size of the reported deficit. For example, in 1996, the Senate
Republicans proposed a budget that would achieve "balance" by
2002. However, the projected 2002 Social Security surplus of $104
. ..... 107
billion was included in the zero-deficit calculation. In the
abstract, Congress probably favors taking Social Security off
budget, so as to please constituents who fear it will otherwise be
cut. But in practice, the majority in Congress is not presently
willing to confront the kind of spending cuts or tax increases
necessary to balance the budget without the aid of Social Security.
IV. The Hatch Amendment
Although there are reasons to suspect that a Balanced Budget
Amendment that excludes Social Security from the balance
calculation is ultimately more likely to win congressional approval
and subsequent ratification, the passage of such an amendment is
inherently speculative. In contrast, Balanced Budget
Amendments substantially similar to the Hatch version have
already won the approval of two-thirds of each house, albeit in
different years. 08 Thus, most legal scholars who have considered
the public policy implications of the ratification of a Balanced
Budget Amendment have used the Hatch Amendment as their
paradigm•10
The primary motivation of the Hatch Amendment's would-be
framers is to inscribe a principle of fiscal discipline into the
Constitution. The framers see the government's decision to carry
a permanent deficit as an affront to intergenerational equity,
because such an approach saddles future generations with high
levels of debt. The Balanced Budget Amendment is seen by its
proponents as the only way of re-establishing intergenerational
107 See Balanced Budget Amendment: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 105th Cong. 1 (1997) (statement of Senator Byron Dorgan).
108 See S. REP. No. 105-3, at 4-6 (1997). Very similar Balanced Budget
Amendments passed the Senate in 1982 and the House in 1995. The 1982 Senate
version did not include a clause relating to the debt limit, and did contain a
provision that total receipts could not increase in a given year "by a rate greater than
the rate of increase in national income in the ... [preceding] year" without the
enactment of a resolution permitting such an increase by a majority in each house.
S.J. Res. 58, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1982).
109 See, e.g., Seto, supra note 17; Tobin, supra note 17; Lavinia L. Mears, Note, The
Truth About the Balanced Budget Amendment, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 592 (1996).
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equity in a political milieu in which the traditional norm of
balance has fallen by the wayside."0 The framers argue that while
the federal government has expanded into so many areas that
have traditionally been the responsibilities of the states, Congress
has not adjusted taxes to keep pace with its "voracious appetite"
for new spending." The Senate Committee Report even brushes
gently against the third rail, contemplating Social Security cuts in
order to help balance the budget."2 While the Committee goes to
great lengths to say that its members do not want to cut Social
Security benefits, they refuse to rule out such a move. The
proponents of the Hatch Amendment envision Social Security
competing on an equal footing with other budgetary priorities.
Social Security will be protected not by institutional factors, or by
entitlement status, but by its lasting popularity and importance to
voters.
If a court were to thoroughly examine the legislative history
of the Hatch Amendment it could settle the otherwise highly
contentious issue of whether to include Social Security's balances
in the deficit calculation."' Other potential judicial resources
would be less helpful. The text of the Hatch Amendment says
nothing about whether Social Security outlays and receipts should
be included in the budgetary balance calculation. 14  Moreover,
the experiences of the states should not be particularly illustrative
'10 S. REP. No. 105-3, at 2.
"l See id. at 3.
12 See id. at 14.
The motivation for exempting Social Security from the Balanced-Budget
Amendment is to ensure that Social Security benefits will not be cut. The
Committee understands this concern, but believes it to be misplaced.
Passage of S.J. Res. 1 does not in any way mean Social Security benefits
will be reduced. It only requires Congress to choose among competing
programs in allocating budget cuts. There is every reason to believe the
power of the electorate will continue to ensure that Social Security will
compete very well.
Id.
"1 Even if ajudge refused to examine legislative history as a matter of principle,
she would still be likely to take note of legislative practice. For example, if the same
Congress ratified the Amendment and passed a budget that was projected to balance
in 2002 only after taking the Social Security surpluses into account, this would send a
clear message to judicial interpreters that Congress understood the Amendment to
include the OASDI trust funds in the budget calculation.
114 SeeS.J. Res. 1, 105th Cong. (1997).
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here. Many of the state balanced budget requirements do not
specify which, if any, funds are included in the balance
calculation.'1 5 In these states, legislatures themselves often doctor
the reported deficits by modifying the funds that are included in
the operating budget. Learning from this, the Hatch
Amendment's sponsors sought to prevent this type of
circumvention by ensuring that all forms of expenditures counted
towards budgetary balance." 6 At first glance, this divergence of
views suggests a conflict between the interpretations of Congress
and the state legislatures about whether Social Security would be
counted towards the deficit under the Hatch Amendment.
However, Section 6 of the Amendment provides that Congress will
implement the Amendment by appropriate legislation."1
7
Accordingly, even if state legislators suspect that Congress would
not include Social Security in the deficit, they would almost
certainly recognize that it would be up to Congress to define
revenues and expenditures through implementing legislation.
The defeat of the Dorgan Amendment alone would not
render the legislative history unequivocal on the question of
whether Social Security receipts and outlays are to be included in
the deficit calculation. As was previously stated, the Dorgan
Balanced Budget Amendment consists of the Hatch Amendment,
verbatim, plus the Social Security exclusion."8 Accordingly, its
failure to achieve passage can be thought of as a clear indication
that Congress chose not to exclude Social Security from the
deficit calculation. However, this is not equivalent to an explicit,
affirmative vote by Congress to include Social Security outlays and
receipts in the deficit calculation. After all, amendments to
legislation can be rejected because the majority disagrees with
their substance or sees the amendment as a "spurious or
unnecessary attempt to clarify" what is already clear. 19
Alternatively, Congress can reject an amendment because it
" See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, STATE BALANCED BUDGET
REQUIREMENTS: PROVISIONS AND PRACTICE 1 (1992).
116 See S. REP. No. 105-3, at 14-15.
117 See S.J. Res. 1, 105th Cong. § 6 (1997). This section states that "the Congress
shall enforce and implement this article by appropriate legislation .... Id.
118 See id.; S.J. Res. 12, 105th Cong. (1997).
119 Reed Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: Dipping into Legislative History, 11
HorsTRAL. REv. 1125, 1133 (1983).
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prefers to delegate the decision of whether to clarify the textual
meaning to future Congresses. 120  Only by ruling out these
alternative explanations for Congress' rejection of the Dorgan
Amendment and subsequent approval of the Hatch Amendment
could a court find a definitive answer to the Social Security
question in the legislative history.1
2 1
Apparently, no one in Congress thought that the Hatch
Amendment already excluded Social Security from the balanced
budget calculation. Certainly, that is the message the majority
articulated in the Senate Committee Report, which states that
"[c]ontributions to social insurance programs... should be
included in receipts." 22 Moreover, at no time during the 105th
Congress did a Republican Senator take issue with Senator
Dorgan's allegations that the Hatch Balanced Budget Amendment
did not exclude Social Security, 12 even though public opinion
polls show that the electorate overwhelmingly supports a Social
• • 124
Security exclusion. Clearly, Republicans could have gained
political advantages, and possibly assembled a winning coalition,
by arguing that Social Security would already be exempted under
the Hatch Amendment. Their decision not to do so can be
interpreted as a coordinated effort not to muddle the legislative
history, and to ensure that if courts ever delved into the history of
the Amendment, they would find that Social Security receipts and
outlays were unequivocally to be counted towards balance. The
120 See Komesar, supra note 37, at 195.
121 While courts generally find committee reports more reliable than the record
of accepted and rejected amendments in determining legislative intent, they still
assign the latter a reasonably high degree of credibility. See Patricia Wald, Some
Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L.
REv. 195, 202 (1983).
122 S. REP. No. 105-3, at 24 (1997). "The primary thrust of the letter is the
contention that the Social Security Program will be harmed if it is included within
the scope of S.J. Res. 1.... There is nothing to suggest that Social Security will be
harmed by its inclusion within the Balanced-Budget Amendment." Id. at 15. "[Nlot
including or exempting the present day [Social Security] surplus in budgetary
calculations, the Committee believes, will both harm the future viability of the trust
funds and require more cuts than necessary in other Federal programs." Id. at 13.
123 This statement is rather categorical. However, I conducted exhaustive
keyword searches of hearings, floor debates, and testimony and determined with a
high degree of certainty that no Republican Senator deviated from the party line.
124 See Hearings, supra note 15.
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Committee Report language cited previously125 also shows that the
Hatch Amendment's backers did not wish to leave the definition
of balance to future Congresses. 126 Indeed, they feared that those
future Congresses would circumvent the Amendment by making
expedient decisions to count or not count budgetary items
towards balance. 12' Thus, in this case, the Senate majority's
decision to reject the Dorgan Amendment should be interpreted
as a clear signal to future constitutional interpreters that Social
Security must be included in the budget for the purposes of
calculating balance.
Seen in this light, a court would likely interpret the Balanced
Budget Amendment as a sweeping effort to make fiscal
responsibility a compelling constitutional obligation. While the
framers of the Hatch Amendment were careful to articulate their
support for the Social Security program, they made the goal of
preserving Social Security secondary to the goal of achieving fiscal
discipline and intergenerational equity. The norm of balanced
budgets was enshrined as an affirmative, permanent constitutional
imperative.'2 As for Social Security, it would fend for itself in the
budgetary process. While backers of the Hatch Amendment
betrayed no desire to tear down at least one of Social Security's
125 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
126 Paul Kahn questions the constitutional legitimacy of acts in which a Congress
seeks to establish statutory rules that decrease the fiscal discretion of future
Congresses. See Paul W. Kahn, Gramm-Rudman and the Capacity of Congress to Control
the Future, 13 HASrINGS CONsT. L.Q. 185 (1986). Although this concern might not be
relevant in the case of a Balanced Budget Amendment Kahn's critique appears quite
damaging as applied to the Amendment's implementing legislation. One might
legitimately ask whether a committee report and subsequent judicial interpretation
thereof ought to prevent future Congresses from concluding that the Hatch
Amendment allows Congress to exclude the OASDI Trust Funds from the deficit
calculation. On the other hand, to answer this question in the negative is to invite
circumvention of the Constitution.
127 See S. REP. No. 105-3, at 15; H.R- REP. No. 104-3, at 6 (1995).
128 In contrast, the framers did not wish to favor fiscal discipline over military
spending during wartime. See S.J. Res. 1, 105th Cong. § 5 (1997). "The Congress
may waive the provisions of this article for any fiscal year in which a declaration of
war is in effect." Id.
129 Admittedly, it is an imperative that Congress can ignore for a year by attaining
the approval of a supermajority in each house. Nevertheless, fiscal discipline
remains an imperative in the sense that unless Congress has significant leeway to
make spending reductions, it is unlikely to be able to achieve balance during any
fiscal year.
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institutional safeguards,"10 they wanted to put the program on an
equal playing field with other government functions. They see
fiscal discipline as a method of ensuring that the government will
be able to return to the Social Security Administration the billions
of dollars it is currently borrowing from the trust fund each year.131
The philosophical perspective held by the Hatch Amendment's
proponents is that fiscal discipline is the fundamental goal, and
Social Security's continued viability is a positive consequence.
This ranking of priorities, evident in the legislative history, could
have profound implications for how the courts think about Social
Security benefits in a post-Balanced Budget Amendment world.
By embedding the principle of fiscal discipline into the
Constitution, the Hatch Amendment could enable Congress to
make almost any change in Social Security that would help
promote that goal."' Section 6 of the Amendment directs
Congress to enforce the Amendment through legislation. 3  Thus,
any sequestration measure, and probably every annual budget bill,
would be enacted pursuant to this explicit constitutional grant of
authority to achieve balance.
To illustrate the effect of this new authority, imagine that in
'30 See S. REP. 105-3, at 13 (maintaining that Social Security's statutory "firewall"
protections-requiring that any increases in Social Security spending or decreases in
Social Security payroll contributions be completely offset so as not to worsen the
Trust Funds' balance-would remain in force under the Hatch Amendment). The
firewall provisions are codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 633(f) (2), 642(a) (2) (1994); see also
Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, § 13301-02.
"I' See S. REP. No. 105-3, at 14.
112 The ratification of a Balanced Budget Amendment would transfer the source
of Congress' freedom to modify entitlements from prudential separation of powers
doctrines to the Constitution's text. Under present case law, Congress has a great
deal of freedom to modify an individual's statutory entitlement to benefits. See
Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115 (1985). The Supreme Court distinguished between
judicial review of congressional programmatic changes in the food-stamp program,
in which the courts would focus on compliance with substantive limitations on the
power of Congress, and administrative determinations about whether individuals
were eligible for food stamps, in which the courts would invalidate any procedure
that did not comport with due process protections. See id. at 129. Legislative
decisions to alter benefit levels cannot violate the Due Process Clause, because "the
legislative determination provides all the process that is due." Id. at 130. However,
administrative regulations can implement those reductions in a way that violates due
process rights. The Equal Protection Clause, rather than the Due Process Clause,
operates as the primary constraint on Congress' ability to modify entitlement
programs.
133 See S.J. Res. 1,105th Cong. §6 (1997).
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2010, Congress eliminates entitlement benefits for all Americans
who are dual citizens. A hypothetical dual American and Austrian
citizen named Mr. Schmidt, who has lived in America since age
twenty-five, brings suit seeking a restoration of his Social Security
benefits. Under current law, a court might adopt the U.S.
Supreme Court's approach in Flemming v. Nestor,134 which held that
noncontractual interests of employees covered by the Social
Security Act are not analogous to those of the holder of an
annuity, whose rights are based on payments arranged by
contract."' The Flemming decision stressed that Social Security was
designed to maintain "flexibility and boldness in adjustment to
everchanging conditions., 136 The federal government therefore
can reduce or deny an individual's Social Security benefits, subject
to the Fifth Amendment's due process provisions. 137 Under
Flemming, without a Balanced Budget Amendment, the
elimination of Schmidt's Social Security benefits would be
unconstitutional only if the deprivation of benefits was based on a
"patently arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in rational
justification." 138 Schmidt would probably not prevail, since the
government could argue that dual citizens are, as a group, more
likely to be eligible to receive old age benefits from another
national government. In this context, the ratification of Hatch
Amendment would merely make the government's case even
stronger.
However, it has been argued that Supreme Court cases
subsequent to Flemming laid the groundwork for a serious re-
evaluation of the Court's stance towards Social Security as a
property interest. 3 9 Most prominently, in Weinberger v. Weisenfeld,'4
the Supreme Court struck down a provision of the Social Security
Act that provided female wage earners with lower survivor benefits
134 363 U.S. 603 (1960)
135 See id. at 610 (permitting the termination of Social Security benefits for
individuals who had previously been members of the American Communist Party).
136 Id.
137 See id. at 611; U.S. CONST. amend. V.
138 Flemming, 363 U.S. at 611.
139 See Robert M. Cover, Social Security and Constitutional Entitlement, in SOCIAL
SECURrk: BEYOND THE RHETORIC OF CRisis 80 (Theodore R. Marmor & Jerry L.
Mashaw eds., 1988).
140 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
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for their widowers relative to the benefits that widows of male
wage earners would receive.' The majority opinion was premised
on the idea that female workers had earned the right to survivor
benefits that were commensurate with their contributions to the
system - a property rights framework that Flemming rejected.
4 2
Justice Brennan's opinion tried to push Social Security recipients'
property rights as far as they could go towards vested rights
without overruling Flemming.43 If it is in fact correct that the law is
slowly moving towards a recognition of accrued property rights in
Social Security, then the Balanced Budget Amendment would
reverse that trend. By enshrining fiscal discipline as a goal of
constitutional import, it would strengthen the government's
argument that lowering the deficit by denying benefits to a class of
recipients furthers a compelling government interest. To buttress
this claim, the government could argue that by rejecting the
Dorgan Amendment, Congress had considered and rejected the
idea of protecting Social Security from benefit reductions that
might arise out of congressional efforts to balance the budget.
Thus, if the Hatch Amendment were enacted, it appears that
lawsuits filed to prevent the reduction of an individual's Social
Security benefits, already rendered unlikely to succeed under
Flemming, would be summarily rejected by the courts.
In the context of Social Security Disability Insurance, where
procedural disputes are likely to arise in response to
administrative determinations that individuals are not eligible for
benefits,'" the ratification of the Balanced Budget Amendment
141 See id. at 645.
142 See id. at 647 (citing Flemming, 363 U.S. at 610).
143 See id.
It is true that social security benefits are not necessarily related directly to
tax contributions, since the OASDI system is structured to provide
benefits in part according to presumed need. For this reason, Flemming
held that the position of a covered employee "cannot be soundly
analogized to that of the holder of an annuity, whose right to benefits is
bottomed on his contractual premium payments." But the fact remains
that the statutory right to benefits is directly related to years worked and
amount earned by a covered employee, and not to the need of the
beneficiaries directly.
Id. (quoting Flemming, 363 U.S. at 610.
144 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Disability: Why Does the Search for Good Programs Continue?,
in SOCIAL SECURrIY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 105, 116-19 (Eric 1R Kingson & James H.
Schulz eds., 1997).
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would likely have a more profound effect. In Mathews v.
Eldridge,45 the Supreme Court held that the courts would conduct
"utilitarian"' due process review of administrative procedures
that deprived individuals of disability benefits based on a weighing
of three factors: (1) the private interest that may be affected by
the government action; (2) the risk of wrongful deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used; and (3) the
government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the procedural requirement
would entail.1 47 Among the government interests that the court
would weigh is its interest in conserving scarce financial
resources. 4  After the ratification of the Hatch Amendment, a
court would presumably assign more weight to the conservation of
these resources, resulting in a weakening of due process
protections for those cut off from the Disability Insurance
program. Again, in defending itself against future suits filed by
those cut off from the program, the government's lawyers could
point to the legislative history of the Balanced Budget
Amendment and show that Congress, in rejecting the Dorgan
Amendment, made a conscious effort not to provide the Disability
Insurance program's clientele with special protections against
fiscal pressures created by the need for budgetary balance.
There is a significant possibility that an enhanced
constitutional interest in fiscal discipline resulting from the
ratification of the Hatch Amendment would make it easier for the
federal government to deny individuals other types of welfare and
social insurance payments as well. The result could be something
akin to the constitutional disentitlement of these programs, a step
beyond the statutory disentitlement that recently occurred with
respect to the former Aid to Families with Dependent Children
program.'4 It has been suggested that the current Supreme Court
is interested in excising from due process jurisprudence the last
145 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
14 See Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U.
CHI. L. REv. 28, 47-49 (1976).
147 See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335.
148 See id.
149 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
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vestiges of the "New Property" theory150 that provided the basis forrz~~~ .11I 152
the Goldberg v. Kelly decision. 2 In passing the Hatch
Amendment, Congress might be doing just that. Faced with
competing claims by an individual with a statutory right to receive
a benefit, and a government with a constitutional obligation to
eliminate an unexpected deficit without reneging on contractual
agreements, the courts would be almost obligated to set aside any
statutory entitlement to welfare payments.
V. The Dorgan Amendment
A number of Democratic legislators have proposed Balanced
Budget Amendments that do not include outlays or receipts to or
from the OASDI trust fund in the deficit. The primary Senate
version of the bill in the 105th Congress is the Dorgan
Amendment, which is identical to the Wyden Amendment
introduced in the 104th Congress. The most notable provision
of the Dorgan Amendment is Section 7, which states:
Total receipts shall include all receipts of the United
States Government except those derived from
borrowing. Total outlays shall include outlays of the
United States Government except for those for
repayment of debt principle. The receipts (including
attributable interest) and outlays of the Federal Old-Age and
Survivors Insurance and the Federal Disability Insurance Trust
Funds (as and if modified to preserve the solvency of the Funds)
used to provide old age, survivors, and disabilities benefits shall
154
not be counted as receipts or outlays for purposes of this article.
The italicized sentence in Section Seven is the only difference
between the Dorgan Amendment and the Hatch version of the
150 See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73YALEL.J. 733 (1964).
151 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (stating that welfare recipients who had their benefits
terminated without a pre-termination adjudicatory hearing were deprived of their
property without due process of law).
152 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Due Process Counterrevolution of the 199 0s?, 96
COLUM. L. REv. 1973, at 1988-98 (1996).
153 See S.J. Res. 12, 105th Cong. (1997) and S.J. Res. 54, 104th Cong. (1996),
respectively; see also H.J. Res. 45, 105th Cong. (1997) (House version of the
Amendment, containing different wording from that proposed in the Dorgan
Amendment).
154 S.J. Res. 12, 105th Cong. § 7 (1997) (emphasis added).
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Balanced Budget Amendment.5 5 Assuming that none of the
original sponsors of the Hatch Amendment would have voted
against Dorgan's proposal, the bill would have won more than
seventy votes in the Senate. However, the Senate rejected the
€- _ €,. 156
Dorgan Amendment by a party-line vote of fifty-five to forty-five.
This occurred despite the fact that exclusion of the Social Security
trust fund from the deficit calculation is popular with the
public. 57  The best explanation for this is that the Senate
Republicans are waiting for what they see as the better Balanced
Budget Amendment and prefer to try to secure its passage after
the next election rather than compromising on Social Security.
However, for the purposes of this discussion we will assume that a
sufficient number of Republicans see this as the country's best
chance to pass some form of a Balanced Budget Amendment, and
agree to support the Dorgan wording.
The congressional legislative history suggests that the primary
purpose of the Dorgan Amendment is to prevent the budget
balancing process from resulting in reductions in Social Security
benefits or increases in payroll taxes. By removing the Social
Security trust funds from the base used for deficit calculations, the
Dorgan Amendment would prevent Social Security reductions
proposed for the purpose of reducing the deficit. Indeed, the
reason Congress originally established a separate trust fund for
Social Security was to give the program added protection against
those who would be tempted to raid such a large revenue
source.5 9 It seems rather clear that ratification of the Dorgan
version of the Balanced Budget Amendment would strengthen
that program against attacks by deficit hawks. Legislators who
propose reducing the size of government by means testing Social
Security benefits, for example, would have no ability to use those
savings to lower the reported deficit. Given the popularity of the
program with beneficiaries, such a reduction would anger a
powerful constituency without producing tangible benefits that
the public could appreciate. In light of these realities, it is hard to
155 SeeS.J. Res 1, 105th Cong. (1997).
156 See 143 CONG. REc. S1811-01 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1997) (statement of Sen. Reid).
157 See supra note 15.
158 See Hearings, supra note 107 (statement of Sen. Dorgan).
159 See supra text accompanying note 102.
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imagine that anything but a desire to preserve the trust fund's
solvency or lower payroll taxes would motivate Congress to cut
Social Security benefits.
Under the Dorgan Amendment, there would still be
significant oversight of the Social Security program, but the Social
Security trustees, and not Congress, would most likely be the
group involved in that oversight. This shift would constitute a
radical redefinition of the trustees' job description, since their
most significant duty under the present system is to make reports
to Congress on the financial health of the funds.' 6° As is the case
in states that have off-budget public employee pension programs,
161 oversight would focus on the program's solvency, not on its
contribution to a potential deficit crisis.
The Dorgan Amendment would have another important
short-term effect. Like the Hatch alternative, the Dorgan
Amendment requires a reduction of the deficit to zero by 2002 or
the second fiscal year after the Amendment's ratification,
whichever is later. In order to achieve that target by 2002, the
Dorgan Amendment would require some combination of tax
increases and draconian cuts in non-Social Security spending.
With Social Security currently running surpluses of approximately
sixty-five billion dollars annually, even the more fiscally
conservative Republicans seem unwilling to swallow the cuts
necessary to balance the budget without those extra revenues.163
"6 See Social Security Act § 201(c) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 401(c) (2).
161 See, e.g., 7 HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 87-21 to 29 (Michie 1996); 4 MASs. GEN.
LAWS. ANN. ch. 32, § 23 (West 1996).
162 See S.J. Res. 12 § 8. Presently, the sponsors of the Dorgan Amendment do not
appear to expect it to pass. If they did, they might be tempted to delay the date by
which balance had to be achieved. This would allow Congress to phase in the
sacrifices necessary to achieve balance. However, such a hypothetical is so far
removed from the status quo as to render its implications beyond the scope of this
article. Such a change would radically alter the cuts-now-versus-cuts-later theory of
the Hatch-Dorgan debate, discussed infra at notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
163 See President Clinton's FY '98 Budget Proposal. Hearings Before the House of
Representatives Ways and Means Committee, 105th Cong. 52 (1997) (transcribing
question by Rep. Jim Bunning during statement of Robert Rubin, Treasury
Secretary); see also S. REP. No. 105-3, at 32 (1997) (additional views of Sen.
Abraham).
In 2002 alone, Congress would have to first balance the unified budget,
and then save an additional $104 billion to balance the budget
exempting Social Security. Over the years 2002 to 2007, these
amendments would require that Congress either cut spending, raise
BALANCED BUDGET AMENDMENT
To an astute observer, this appears paradoxical. Moderate and
liberal Democrats are willing to make deep cuts in government
spending that frighten even the most fiscally conservative
Republicans. In attempting to explain such behavior, several
possibilities come to mind: (1) Democrats could be bluffing,
providing themselves with political cover by backing an
Amendment that they know the Republicans will never adopt; (2)
Democrats might believe that they can achieve the necessary
deficit reductions through tax increases; or (3) Democrats may be
less concerned about the short-term cuts necessary to achieve
balance if the trust fund is excluded, than with the long-term cuts
that will be necessary if the trust fund is included, once the Baby
Boomers retire and the Social Security program begins causing
enormous annual deficits.'6
The first possible motivation for the Democratic attitude
raises interesting - but not unique - questions for subsequent
judicial interpretation. If the Amendment were truly introduced
as a killer amendment that did not have the votes to pass, but
subsequently gained majority support, the courts would almost be
obligated to disregard the actual original intent. Such was the
case with the gender discrimination component of Title VII,
which was an addition designed to defeat a bill that combated
discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin.'r In
interpreting the congressional intent of Title VII's gender
discrimination provisions, the courts have not regarded it as a
provision intended to weaken protections against racial
discrimination. Similarly, even if Senator Dorgan's intention was
to sabotage the Balanced Budget Amendment, by the time the
measure won the approval of two-thirds of each house, the
"legislative intent" must have changed. In the days leading up to a
final vote on the Dorgan Amendment, the head counters on the
taxes, or both, by an additional $706 billion.
Id. at 31.
16 See, e.g., 143 CONG. REc. 1352 (1997) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
"6 See Patti Buchman, Note, Title VII Limits on Discrimination Against Television
Anchorwomen on the Basis of Age-Related Appearance, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 190 (1985).
The insertion of the word "gender" was a last-minute measure by Representative
Howard Smith of Virginia to kill the bill by inserting a controversial provision. Its
late addition left a shortage of legislative history. "For this reason, the aims of Title
VII's proscription of gender discrimination must be pieced together from its
subsequent legislative history .. " Id. at 193 n.14.
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Democratic side would have seen that they had enough votes to
win passage of their Amendment. Arriving at this juncture, they
would then be faced with a difficult choice: drop their support for
the Amendment, thereby weakening their political credibility, or
vote for an Amendment that they do not really support.
Presumably, however, there would have been a substantial faction
of Senators who supported the Amendment for less cynical
reasons. In subsequent judicial interpretation of the Dorgan
Amendment's legislative history, the courts would probably take
Dorgan's public explanations of the Amendment's rationale at
face value, or focus on this latter faction of Senators. After all,
absent some statement by Dorgan supporters that their intention
is merely to kill the Hatch Amendment, reading such intentions
into the Amendment would express profound disrespect for a
coordinate political, which the courts are loathe to do.'
The second hypothesized explanation for the Democrats'
support of the Dorgan Amendment, a desire to raise taxes, seems
highly implausible given the current political climate. Today,
most Democrats are unlikely to support highly visible tax
increases, given the country's present anti-tax sentiments.
Moreover, even those Democrats who would support tax increases
probably have very low confidence that higher taxes would win
majority approval in Congress.
The third possible explanation for the paradox is worth
exploring in more detail, because it is rarely noticed. Under
Section One of the Hatch Amendment, assuming that it is
interpreted to include Social Security in the deficit calculation,
Congress is prohibited from allowing for an excess of outlays over
receipts without the approval of a three-fifths supermajority in
167
each house. However, the Social Security program is currently
projected to begin spending more than it takes in after 2018, and
to exhaust any surplus in the OASDI trust fund by 2030. Thus,
166 Compare the discussion of the political question doctrine in the text
accompanying notes 45, 49-57.
167 See S.J. Res. 1, 105th Cong. § 1 (1997). According to Section 5 of the
Amendment, however, a simple majority would allow such an excess during years in
which a declaration of war is in effect or in which the United States is engaged in a
"military conflict which causes an imminent and serious military threat to national
security." Id. § 5.
11 See Robert J. Myers, Will Social Security be Therefor Me?, in SOCIAL SECURrrY IN
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the Hatch Amendment would make it difficult to use these
surpluses for their intended purpose. Presented with Senator
Feingold's reasonable Amendment, which would have allowed
Congress to "permit the use of an accumulated surplus to balance
the budget during any fiscal year," the majority balked.19
Accordingly, in order to run the Social Security program during
the 2020's, Congress would either have to secure a three-fifths
majority approving such an excess, reduce benefits, raise FICA
taxes, or run an offsetting surplus in the rest of the budget.' 70 In
order to achieve an offsetting surplus, hundreds of billions of
dollars of spending cuts or tax increases would be required each
year. Of course, the Dorgan Amendment avoids these difficulties
by failing to include Social Security in the deficit picture.
The rationale for the majority's rejection of the Feingold
Amendment may be difficult to fathom, but the legislative history
points overwhelmingly to one justification for opposing the
Dorgan version. The sponsors of the Hatch Amendment are
concerned that exempting Social Security from the deficit would
allow future Congresses to circumvent the Balanced BudgetAm / 171
Amendment. They fear that their successors could redefine
other types of spending programs as Social Security, thereby
creating a loophole in the Amendment. Indeed, such a scenario
is not difficult to imagine. For example, Congress could merge
the Social Security and Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
programs, and call the new program Social Security, thereby
taking SSI off-budget. A bolder Congress could try to do the same
thing with veterans' benefits, or even some entirely new
entitlement. Realistically, however, doing so would likely be
opposed by a huge constituency of Social Security recipients, who
would understand such a move as a threat to the program's
solvency.17  More damaging to the Republican argument is the
THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 144, at 210.
169 143 CONG. REc. 1690-05 (1997) (clerk's report of the pending business).
170 See Chait, supra note 11, at 13.
171 SeeS. REP. No. 105-3, at 14 (1997).
172 The Republican argument is persuasive as it relates to Medicare. Medicare
and Social Security have, by and large, the same beneficiaries. Therefore, political
opposition to a merger of the separate trust funds might never materialize. For that
reason, Congress has been able to use one trust fund to bail out the other on several
occasions. There are relatively minor areas of beneficiary disjunction. For example,
many state and local government employees, as well as the chronically unemployed,
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fact that the Dorgan Amendment, as worded, might preclude
Congress from just such creative redefinition of Social Security by
making such actions unconstitutional.' Section Seven may
prohibit Congress from making changes to the OASI and DI trust
funds that do not preserve the funds' solvency.'74 Because packing
a new entitlement into Social Security would probably not be
intended to preserve Social Security's solvency, the program's
trustees might consequently have a macro-enforcement cause of
action.
175
are covered by Medicare Part A, but not by Social Security. Some Americans in the
62-64 age range are covered by Social Security but not Medicare. Of course, in a
very real sense, the constituency for a social insurance program consists of those who
are soon to receive benefits, as well as those whose loved ones receive benefits.
173 Provided that a plaintiff such as the Social Security Trustees could overcome
the barriers to judicial macro-enforcement discussed in Section II-A, supra.
174 See S.J. Res. 12, 105th Cong. § 8 (1997).
175 This would not always be the case. For example, if in the future the Medicare
trust fund were running enormous long-term surpluses, the merger of that trust
fund with OASI would promote the OASI fund's long-term solvency. Nevertheless,
Section Seven's language, stating that the OASDI trust funds may be modified to
preserve the solvency of the Funds, raises the provocative question of whether the
intent of any modification must be to further the goal of preserving the solvency of
the funds, or whether any change is appropriate so long as the funds remain solvent.
In determining which of two reasonable readings of the "preserve the solvency"
language in the Dorgan Amendment is appropriate, the federal courts could adopt
a framework similar to the one adopted by the West Virginia's highest court in
Dadisman v. Moore. 384 S.E.2d 816 (W. Va. 1989). That case involved the ability of
the legislature and governor to underfund the state's pension program for retired
state employees. See id. The court determined that the governor had a
nondiscretionary, statutory duty to adequately fund the pension in his budget
proposal. See id. at 824.
This gubernatorial duty was subject to judicial review so as to provide
protection for the contractually vested property rights of the retired employees, in
the form of their pensions. See id. at 824, 827. In reviewing the governor's actions,
the court adopted a reasonableness test. See id. Legislative modifications to a pension
plan were reasonable if "the alteration to the pension scheme serves to keep the
system sound and flexible." Id. at 827. The governor had argued that as long as the
pension system continued to pay benefits, the system remained sound. See id.
However, in rejecting that argument, the West Virginia court held that any
reduction in government funding for the pension scheme below what the pension's
trustees had requested was an unreasonable reduction. See id. The opinion
contained strong language stating that the trust funds were not "state funds for
expropriation or use for any purpose other than that for which the moneys were
entrusted." Id. at 819-20. Subsequent to that decision, the governor began
adequately funding the pension. See id. However, the state refused to compensate
the fund for the four years during which the state underfunded the pension. See id.
In subsequent litigation, the Supreme Court upheld this underfunding, because the
BALANCED BUDGET AMENDMENT
There is another way of understanding the present debate
between the supporters of the Hatch and Dorgan Amendments.
It may be that the proponents of the Hatch Amendment believe
that the budget must be balanced immediately. They recognize
that it is not politically feasible to reach short-term budgetary
balance if the Social Security surpluses are not used to offset the
deficit. They understand that this will necessitate enormous
spending cuts or tax increases in the long run, once the Social
Security program begins causing annual deficits. However, such
an event is so far in the future that it extends beyond their
political time horizons. More charitably, they may feel that
federal expenditures can be radically reduced, but that achieving
such a goal will take decades. There are only a few hints of this
sentiment in the Balanced Budget Amendment's legislative
history;' 76 however, that should not surprise one who accepts this
view of the legislative intent. Republicans who are sponsoring a
constitutional amendment that purports to promote
intergenerational equity in fiscal policy would be sensitive to
attacks that they are leaving future taxpayers to make the major
sacrifices necessary for achieving real budgetary balance. If this
factor, rather than fears about circumvention, is the primary
motivation for the majority's rejection of the Dorgan
Amendment, then two possible explanations for the Democrats'
behavior emerge: either they are sponsoring the Dorgan
Amendment as a killer amendment, or they are more concerned
with potential long-term damage to Social Security than with
short-term cuts to other government programs.17
expected stream of present and future contributions to the fund were sufficient to
render the fund actuarially sound. See Dadisman v. Caperton, 413 S.E.2d 684, 688
(W. Va. 1991). In adopting this approach, the West Virginia Court followed the
reasoning of the majority of state courts that have confronted this problem. See, e.g.,
Valdes v. Cory, 189 Cal. Rptr. 212, 222 (1983); Weaver v. Evans, 495 P.2d 639 (Wash.
1972); Dombrowski v. City of Phila., 245 A.2d 238 (1968). But see Kosa v. Treasurer,
292 N.W.2d 452 (Mich. 1980) (holding that impairment of retirees' contractual
rights is minimal where pension benefits are still being paid).
176 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 105-3, at 13 ("[N]ot including or exempting the present
day surplus in budgetary calculations, the Committee believes, will.., require more
cuts than necessary in other Federal programs"); President Clinton's FY '98 Budget
Proposal: Hearings Before the House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee, 105th
Cong. 52 (1997) (statement of Rep. Bunning).
177 I could not find any statements in the legislative history in which sponsors of
the Dorgan Amendment extolled the virtues of making immediate cuts.
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Even if this debate over immediate versus future cuts is
driving the dispute between Hatch and Dorgan, the courts are
unlikely to want to read such motivations into the Amendment, as
such a reading could make for bad law. For illustrative purposes,
we will assume that the Dorgan Amendment is ratified, and a
judge who is deferential to legislative intent suspects that the
Hatch Amendment was rejected because Congress wanted to
make immediate and dramatic cuts in federal spending so as to
avoid deeper cuts in the future. What follows if our dual citizen,
Mr. Schmidt, loses his entitlement benefits and files a micro-
enforcement suit? If he files the suit two years after the
ratification of the Amendment, he would not prevail. After all,
the 105th Congress recognized the need for immediate, painful
cuts in spending, to avoid even harsher cuts in the future.
Though disappointed, Schmidt renounces his loyalty to Austria,
and is able to reclaim his benefits. Fast forward to 2020. Mr.
Schmidt has lived to a ripe old age when, unexpectedly, he is once
again stripped of his benefits. It seems Congress has been forced
by the Balanced Budget Amendment to reduce spending, and has
passed a law eliminating entitlement payments to all persons who
previously fought in armed conflicts against the United States.
Schmidt's past as an Austrian soldier in World War II leaves him
susceptible. He again files a micro-enforcement suit, and appears
before the same judge. The judge believes that the 105th
Congress wished to protect those who were scheduled to receive
benefits in 2020. This makes him inclined to rule in Schmidt's
favor. However, the judge also believes in stare decisis, and he is
reluctant to render a ruling that blatantly conflicts with the one
he handed down in a virtually identical case two decades ago.178
This example indicates that even if judges believe that the
Dorgan-Hatch dispute is about the timing of spending cuts or tax
178 In one sense, finding in Mr. Schmidt's favor would not be an inconsistent
ruling, as long as his original opinion contained wording to the effect of, "Let it be
plainly understood that this ruling does not permanently weaken the rights of
beneficiaries. It merely recognizes the intent of Congress to allow for immediate
cuts in spending so as to reach budgetary balance in the short term. If anything, it
will strengthen the case of beneficiaries who, years from now, allege that the
government used the Balanced Budget Amendment as an improper excuse for
unfairly reducing their benefits." Of course, such wording would run into the
problems of judicially delineating between the long and short term, alluded to at
infra note 179.
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increases, they might not give effect to such intentions in
construing the Balanced Budget Amendment. Judges cannot
comfortably create a bright-line division between the long term
and the short term, and even if they could, such lines would likely
be attacked as arbitrary. 9 They would feel very nervous about
writing an opinion that advocated a de facto disentitlement of
benefits, and a re-entitlement of those same benefits several
decades in the future. It is more likely that given the perfectly
plausible interpretation that the Dorgan-Hatch dispute revolved
around the degree of protection to give Social Security and fears
over subsequent congressional circumvention of the Balanced
Budget Amendment, the judge would probably decide to reject
the long-term-versus-short-term understanding of the
Amendment.
VI. Micro-Enforcement and Social Security Claims
The foregoing analysis suggests that passage of the Dorgan
Amendment might do far more to protect Social Security than
merely remove incentives for Congress to reduce spending on the
program in order to shrink the deficit."'8 The Amendment's
ratification would also buttress Social Security relative to other
programs. Under either Balanced Budget Amendment, fiscal
prudence becomes a more compelling government justification
for spending reductions. However, by explicitly excluding the
Social Security trust funds from the Balanced Budget
Amendment, the Dorgan Amendment would make that
compelling justification inapplicable to Social Security. In a
micro-enforcement claim by a Social Security recipient, the
federal courts could well use the reasoning that the state courts
adopted in the breach of contract cases. Namely, they could
decide that the federal government should turn to more
179 Cf Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872-73 (1992) (rejecting rigid
trimester framework that previously governed abortion rights because of the
framework's seemingly arbitrary character).
180 See supra notes 159-73 and accompanying text.
181 This would be true regardless of whether the legislature is statutorily defining
eligibility, or an administrative agency is straining to function within the constraints
of reduced appropriations, by scaling back procedural protections or removing
borderline recipients from the rolls.
182 See supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
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"reasonable" resources to balance the budget, such as tax
increases or reductions in funds committed for block grants,
Medicare, SSI, or foreign aid. Therefore, even if the Dorgan
Amendment does not strengthen Social Security protections
relative to what they were prior to ratification, as a practical matter
it could accomplish exactly that, by strengthening Social Security
relative to other government obligations. Such a change would
place Social Security benefits just below contracts in the hierarchy
of individual property rights vis a vis the government.
Thus arises the question whether this elevation of individual
rights to receive Social Security benefits comports with the
legislative intent of the Dorgan Amendment's backers. The
congressional legislative history suggests an answer in the
affirmative. The proponents view the long-term preservation of
the program as a contractual obligation made by the government, • • 185
to the program's beneficiaries. They see it as a program so
fundamentally important that it must be fully funded, regardless
of budgetary constraints. 8 4 They wish to protect Social Security's
separate status precisely because it is, in their minds, a contract.
In order to determine how the federal courts might deal with
relatively stronger micro-enforcement actions to protect Social
Security benefits, state litigation is again instructive. The closest
state case law analogies are instances in which retired public
employees sued to prevent the state from reducing or eliminating
their pensions.'8 In these cases, the rights of retirees eligible for
pensions to receive those pensions were not quite absolute. For
example, in the case of Weed v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension and
Retirement Systeml' Oklahoma attempted to divest a retired police
officer of his pension based on a subsequent felony conviction.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that where a public employee
had contributed to a state pension plan during his employment,
his rights to receive a pension became contractually vested at the
time of his retirement. Therefore, while his right to receive the
183 See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 107, at 1 (statement of Senator Conrad).
l8 See, e.g., 143 CONG. REc. 1352 (1997) (statement of Senator Kennedy).
"8 See also State Compensation Fund v. Symington, 848 P.2d 273, 279 (Ariz. 1993)
(en banc) (adjudicating a micro-enforcement suit to prevent state taxation of a
worker's compensation fund), discussed at supra note 42.
186 719 P.2d 1276 (Okla. 1986)
187 See id. at 1277.
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pension was not absolute and a felony conviction during his
employment could cost him his benefits, the state could not divest
him of that property right for any crimes committed subsequent to
his retirement. Other states that have tackled cases dealing with
attempts to reduce state employee pensions have followed the189
same approach. Moreover, even where there was doubt as to
whether the legislature intended to confer pension rights upon a
class of recipients, those rights similarly were held to become
vested once an individual employee retired.'90 Of course, in order
to reach these cases, a federal court would first have to declare
that ratification of the Dorgan Amendment, combined with an
evolving public and congressional understanding of Social
Security benefits as contractually guaranteed property rights,
rendered the Supreme Court's holding in Femming obsolete.
However, if the court did so, it might very well adopt the approach
taken by the states in the public employee pension cases, namely,
that anticipated Social Security benefit levels could be adjusted for
those who had not yet begun receiving them, but became
guaranteed once an eligible individual began collecting checks.
Such ajudicial ruling would not only be consistent with successful
state approaches, but would also make political and economic
sense. It seems more sensible to reduce the benefits of those
individuals who still have the capacity to work than of those who
are no longer able to adjust their behavior so as to compensate for
lost income resulting from reduced retirement benefits.
In contrast, if the Hatch Amendment is ratified, Social
Security micro-enforcement claims would not benefit from special
constitutional protection. 91 Rather, they would be placed on the
same plane as claims by individuals who were denied Medicare
benefits, states that were denied expected block grant assistance,
and international organizations that did not receive promised
contributions from the United States Government. Moreover,
passage of the Balanced Budget Amendment would actually
strengthen the government's position in such cases relative to the
188 See id. at 1278.
189 See, e.g., Bellomini v. State Employees' Retirement Bd., 445 A.2d 737, 740 (Pa.
1982); Leonard v. City of Seattle, 503 P.2d 741, 748 (Wash. 1972); see also supra note
175.
190 SeeJohnson v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 770 P.2d 93, 95 (Utah 1988).
191 See supra notes 139-151 and accompanying text.
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current situation. Government flexibility in dealing with a mid-
year shortfall could be enhanced such that a weak form of rational
basis review might be the only judicial protection for those
harmed by sequestration. The rational basis test in such instances
might very well boil down to an examination of whether the
legislature could have rationally concluded that the measure
would save money. Of course, where the government chose to
apportion the costs of sequestration on the basis of race, gender,
or some other suspect classification, a higher level of judicial
scrutiny would still apply. But in the vast majority of cases, the
relative vigor ofjudicial review would be noticeably diminished.
VII. Conclusion
The federal Balanced Budget Amendment has figured
prominently on the congressional agenda for eighteen years.192
While the recent enactment of a balanced budget takes the wind
out of the Amendment's sails for the moment, it is within the
realm of possibility that the Amendment could receive serious
consideration in the next few years. The foregoing analysis reveals
that although much law review ink has been spilled, and the halls
of Congress have been filled with lofty speeches for over a decade,
there remains a tremendous amount of uncertainty about how the
federal courts would deal with the Balanced Budget Amendment.
A major reason for that uncertainty has been the inability of
scholars to stop writing about the glamorous macro-enforcement
cases and focus on comparatively mundane micro-enforcement
cases that, if the states' experiences are any indication, will be
widely adjudicated.
One of the major shortcomings of the constitutional analysis
of the Balanced Budget Amendment has been the failure of
192 In 1979 Senator Hatch introduced S.J. Res. 126, but the Amendment was
defeated in the Judiciary Committee by a vote of eight to nine. Actually, the
Balanced Budget Amendment concept has its origins in the political thought of
ThomasJefferson (who, as President, nevertheless borrowed unprecedented sums to
pay for the Louisiana Purchase). The first time Congress considered the matter was
in 1936, when Representative Harold Knutson introduced a bill that would have
established a per capita limitation on the Federal public debt. See H. Res. 579, 74th
Cong. (1936). Needless to say, such an Amendment would have made it difficult for
the United States to finance its preparation for World War II, with potentially
catastrophic consequences.
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scholars to recognize that such an Amendment would not exist in
a constitutional vacuum. Simply looking at the text of the
Fourteenth Amendment, or even the text supplemented by its
legislative history, does not provide a complete picture of its
importance in a developing .system of constitutional thought.
Much of the Fourteenth Amendment's power arises from its
incorporation of the Bill of Rights. The lesson provided by
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence is that in thinking about a
Balanced Budget Amendment, legal scholars must explore how
such an Amendment would interact with the rest of the
Constitution. In this instance the Amendment could very well
imbue the rest of the Constitution with a philosophy of fiscal
discipline, with far-reaching implications for property rights and
due process protections. In considering whether to adopt a
Balanced Budget Amendment, Congress should consider not only
the programmatic effects of excluding Social Security but the
procedural effects that such a decision might have on individual
claimants.
This article intentionally takes no position on the underlying
issue of whether Congress should, as a matter of fiscal policy,
exempt Social Security from the Balanced Budget Amendment.
The federal deficit that includes Social Security more accurately
reflects the government's current effect on national saving than
does a deficit without Social Security. However, the linkage
between national saving and the deficit, even there, is rather
tenuous. On the other hand, there is, at best, a minimal non-
political rationale for excluding Social Security's outlays and
receipts, but not Medicare's. The two programs' deficits are both
going to fluctuate wildly as a result of demographics, and both
programs are intended to be pre-funded. Ultimately, the decision
whether to exclude Social Security should be made based on
normative, political factors rather than on any allegedly neutral
public policy rationale. Elected politicians rather than judges or
legal scholars are best able to make those kinds of decisions.
Finally, this article suggests that Congress must be wary of
believing either of two tempting fallacies. First, Congress must
recognize that the Dorgan-Hatch debate is not about choosing
between a sincere and a fraudulent way of balancing the budget.
The debate is about what degree of protection Social Security will
have relative to other programs, and the timing of necessary
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sacrifices. Second, Congress should understand that any Balanced
Budget Amendment is likely to find its way into the federal courts
through micro-enforcement actions. When it does, it will
probably be used. by government lawyers to combat individual
claims on the government's resources, and fiscal conservatives
should not be shocked to find themselves cheering on the
sidelines as unelected federal judges enforce the Amendment in
the decades ahead.
